Psychosomatics and Coerced Confessions by Marx, Emily
Volume 57 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 57, 
1952-1953 
10-1-1952 
Psychosomatics and Coerced Confessions 
Emily Marx 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Emily Marx, Psychosomatics and Coerced Confessions, 57 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1952). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol57/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
PSYCHOSOMATICS AND COERCED CONFESSIONS
By
EMILY MARX*
An unwitnessed murder is perpetrated.
The local police arrest a suspect.
If they take him to a magistrate for immediate arraignment he will be set
free, since there is not yet sufficient proof that their suspect is the murderer.
Ther'efore, they hold him incommunicado and question him. They need his help
for further dues; they hope he will confess and thus furnish them with the best
evidence of his guilt.1
We expect such action from our police officers. We want the murderer
found and adequate proof of his guilt assembled so that he will surely be pun-
ished for his crime. But we are finicky about the methods used to assemble such
proofs.
"Try to make him confess," we say, "but treat him gently. No rough stuff.
And no prolonged interrogations." 2 As if the police and the suspect were en-
gaged in an athletic contest, we insist that there be no blows below the belt. Only
"fair" methods may be employed to obtain the confession; otherwise "due proc-
ess" is violated. 8 And the confession must be "voluntary." The suspect must
"wish" to confess, much as the contender in a prize fight voluntarily exposes
himself to the fists of the champion. Although necessarily surrounded by police,
district attorneys and stenographers, the suspect must be in possession of "men-
tal freedom" when he makes his damaging statement. He must feel free to ad-
mit or deny participation in the crime or remain silent. 4
*Member of the bars of New York, New Hampshire, United States Supreme Court, United
States Court of Claims, Second Circuit Court; Treasury Department and Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service; A.B., Barnard College, New York; LL.B., Yale Law School; former justice of
Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York; former assistant attorney-general, New York
state; former editor, Yale Law Journal; member of teaching staff, Institute of Arts and Sciences,
Columbia University.
la Not provable even by circumstantial evidence.
1 People v. Valetutti, 297 N.Y. 226, 231 (1948)-admissions freely and voluntarily made are
"convincing evidence" of guilt; Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51,55 (1895)-
"deserving of the highest credit;" Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896)-there is
a presumption that an innocent person "will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an
untrue statement" of guilt.
2 People v. Calebressi, 233 App. Div. 79, 80 (N.Y. 3rd, 1931)-"police officers should be
active and diligent in securing confessions, but they should obey the law;" Moore v. State, 207
Miss. 140,155 (1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 844 (1949)--officers must have evidence before
going to a magistrate.
3 Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 73 (1949) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601, 607 (1948)-.due process "prohibits the police from using
the private, secret custody of either man or child as a device for wringing confessions from them."
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 238 (1941)-"unfairness is at war with due process."
4 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 596, 602 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154
(1944); Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942); Lisenba v. California, n. 3, p. 241; Ward
v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942).
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If he confesses because of fear of the police or a hostile mob or as the re-
sult of mental or physical torture inflicted upon him by the police or the coin-
munity, his confession may not be used to convict him. Only when his confes-
sion has not been induced by external pressures, is it considered to be a "volun-
tary" admission of guilt.6
Doubt as to the voluntary or involuntary nature of the confession is ordi-
narily resolved by the trial jury.6 But the appellate court is free to review the
facts and determine that, as a matter of law, the confession was "involuntary" or
coerced. 7 Then, "due process" requires that the conviction be set aside even if
sufficient additional evidence was adduced at the trial to support a verdict of
guilty.8 The concededly "voluntary" confession may nevertheless have been ob-
tained "unfairly;" "due process" then prevents its use as evidence against the
accused.9
Before "due process" became of age, coerced confessions were excluded
not because of any judicial revulsion against the use of unfair methods to obtain
them, but because they were deemed "unreliable" and possibly false.l0 The theory
was that some guilty suspects had such a strong sense of guilt that they would
freely unburden themselves and tell the truth while interrogated by the police.
But innocent persons might respond to such interrogations with untruths if their
"fears or hopes" were operated upon by threats or promises of the temporal
authorities.'" Lay juries were instructed to determine from the trial evidence
5 In Lisenba v. California, n. 3, p. 240, a confession obtained after the accused had conferred
with his counsel and heard the confession of his confederate was held to have been voluntary
and not coerced, although he had been threatened by the police and persistently questioned during
eleven days prior to his arraignment. A second confession after the pressures vitiating the first
confession have been removed is admissible. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 541 (1947).
6 Lyons v. Oklahoma, n. 4, p. 602.
7 People v. Crum, 272 N.Y. 348, 350 (1936); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239 (1940); Lisenba v. California. n. 3, p. 237; Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, n. 4, p. 154-36 hours continuous cross-examination without sleep or food held "in-
herently coercive."
8 Malinski v. New York, n. 7, p. 404; Lyons v. Oklahoma, n. 4, p. 597; Haley v. Ohio, n.
3, p. 599.
9 Although the same tests may be used to determine both the voluntary nature of the confession
and the use of "fairness" in its procurement, the questions presented in each are entirely differ-
ent. Lisenba v. California, n. 3, p. 238; Lyons v. Oklahoma, n. 4, p. 603; United States v. Mit-
chell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944). Contra: Malinski v. New York, n. 7, p. 439 (Stone, C. J. dissent-
ing); Ward v. Texas, n. 4, p. 555---confession obtained after a 110 mile automobile ride "was
not free and voluntary but was the product of coercion and duress;" its use at the trial was a
denial of due process.
10 Lisenba v. California, n. 3, p. 236-'"tests are invoked to determine whether the inducement
to speak was such that there is a fair risk the confession is false;" People v. Valletutti, n. 1, p.
232-"hopes or fears artifically excited," added to natural agitation consequent upon being
charged with crime, might result in a false admission.
11 Wilson v. United States, n. 1, p. 622--causing the innocent to lose their "freedom of will
or self control." From the 'evidence, the trial court could determine whether the confession "gen-
erally made by persons under arrest, in great agitation and distress, when every ray of hope is
eagerly caught at, and frequently under the delusion that the merits of a disclosure will be pro-
ductive of personal safety," nevertheless proceeded "merely from a sense of guilt." McGlothlin
v. State, 42 Tenn. 223, 229 (1865).
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whether the confession was "voluntary," defined as uttered by a suspect when his
mind was "free and unconstrained by fear, or inspired by false hope, or threats
or violence, or by illegal and unnecessary delay in arraignment."'
' 2
The confession of such a "free" mind, representing the outpouring of the
guilty conscience, was "true" and sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty of the
crime committed. The confession of the terrorized mind, representing utter-
ances with which the innocent suspect sought to buy his peace from the police,
was "false" and incompetent evidence against him. Theoretically, the first ques-
tion was whether the confession was voluntary or coerced, and the second whether
the confession found to have been voluntary was true. In practice, the questions
were submitted to the jury simultaneously; reviewing courts accepted the probable
truth of the confession as proof of its voluntary nature.' 3
The word "voluntary" was used to connote confessions induced by pressures
other than police or community duress and coercion. Internal pressures, such as a
guilty conscience, desire to avoid investigations which might disclose other crimes
or involve friends and relatives, wishful hope that a lesser punishment might be
imposed by the court, inarticulated psychological compulsions, did not make
the confession involuntary or coerced. The admissible confession was not con-
fined to a spontaneous utterance. It might have been made after 36 hours of po-
lice interrogation, without food or sleep, 14 or after 12 hours of grueling all-
night interrogation during which a pan containing the bones of the murdered per-
sons was placed in his lap.' 5 It was not rnecessary for the police to tell the
suspect of his right to secure counsel and remain silent, or to warn him that his
confession would be used against him.16 To the suggestion that "no cautious per-
son would care to enter into a discussion of his guilt or innocence with his cap-
tors when what he said might be used against him,"'17 many courts replied: "The
tendency of criminal offenders to talk from no other compulsion than their own
guilty consciences is a well-known phychological fact."' 18
When the only questions were whether the confession was true or false
and whether external violence, threats of violence, or authoritative promises of
12 People v. Valetutti, n. 1, p. 231, 238.
18 People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 422 (1927).
14 People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 396 (1932).
15 Lyons v. Oklahoma, n. 4, p. 599-60.
16 People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 158 (1909); People v. Doran, n. 13, p. 423, United
States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 107 (C.A. 2nd, 1945) cert. denied, 326 U.S. 727 (1945) ; Com-
monwealth v. Bryant, 367 Pa. 135 (1951), 79 A.2d 193; Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d
265, 268n (C.A.D.C. 1942); Audler v. Kriss, 79 A.2d 391, 395 (Md. 1951). Texas was the
only state holding contra, because of a statute requiring such warning.
17 People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 160 (1948).
18 Commonwealth v. Bryant, n. 16, p. 198. Cf., Jackson, J. in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, n. 4,
p. 161-voluntary criminal confessions are not similar to religious confessions to rid the soul
of a sense of guilt, but usually proceed from a belief that further denial is useless and perhaps
prejudicial. Cf., Jackson, J. in Gallegos v. Nebraska, U.S. (1951)-a confession is not "coer-
ced" when it results from "the fact that defendant was in custody incommunicado for eight days,
the fear that his deeds were known, and the weight of the crime on his conscience."
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immunity from punishment or -of lesser punishment induced the confession-
merged in practice into the single question of truth or falsity-, damaging state-
ments made by the defendant prior to arraignment were rarely excluded. Claimed
police brutality was treated as the usual and only possible post-confession defense,
raising a question of fact for resolution by court and jury.19
Prolonged detention, in violation of a statute requiring immediate arraign-
ment or arraignment without unnecessary delay, was condemned as scandalous,
criminal and illegal; 20 but did not affect the admissibility of the confession obtained
during that period.21 The use of deception, fraud, violation of confidence, persis-
tent, close, hard questioning pregant with assumption of the suspect's guilt did not
invalidate the confession.
22
Even proof of police threats and coercion did not render the confession
inadmissible. The trial jury was still at liberty to convict if the defendant con-
fessed "because he wanted to confess and the violence or coercion had no bearing
upon his making the confession." 23 For, "more powerful than the external com-
pulsions were the fatal internal struggles of the murderer's secret. It beat at his
heart, rising to his throat demanding disclosure; it betrayed his discretion, broke
down his courage, conquered his prudence. When embarrassed by suspicions
from without, it violently burst forth and confessed." 24 As long as the trial
judge, jury and appellate court were satisfied that the confession was this out-
pouring of a guilty conscience-reified facts demanding to be confessed-and
not a figment of the suspect's imagination, they refused to concern themselves
19 People v. Mummiani, n. 14. Contra: People v. Valletutti, n. 1-brutality held to have
caused confession as a matter of law where there were physical signs of violence plus present
avowal of innocence plus delayed arraignment plus 20 hours incommunicado plus minority of
defendant.
20 People v. Redmond, 265 App. Div. 307, 309 (N.Y. 3rd, 1942); People v. Kelly, 264 App.
Div. 14, 16 (N.Y. 3rd, 1942); N.Y. Penal Law 1844; Bass v. New York, 196 Misc. 177 (Ct.
Cis. N.Y., 1949)-monetary damages of $250 awarded against the State for pre-arraignment
detention and all-night questioning to obtain a confession, after suspect had been identified by
complaining witness.
21 People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 194 (1934); People v. Doran, n. 13, p. 423; People v. Try-
bus, 219 N.Y. 18, 22 (1916); United States v. Mitchell, n. 9, p. 69; Malinski v. New York,
292 N.Y. 360, 372 (1944), revd., n. 7-otherwise, the police would have power "to confer im-
munity" on a criminal. Contra in the federal courts: McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
344, 345 (1943); Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 355 (1943); Upshaw v. United
States, 335 U.S. 410, 413, 414 (1948).
22 People v. White, 176 N.Y. 331, 349 (1903); People v. Buffom, 214 N.Y. 53, 57 (1915);
People v. Furlong, 187 N.Y. 198, 212 (1907); People v. Perez, 300 N.Y. 208, 218, 221 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950); Lyons v. Oklahoma, n. 4, p. 601.
23 Trial court's charge to jury in People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353 (1951).
24 Paraphrased from Daniel Webster's speech in State v. Knapp, quoted in Wharton, 1N-
VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS, 15 (1860). Confessions were entitled to "full credit" when made
"under any frenzy of mind, from the effects of guilt, and anguish, and sufferings, which the
accused could no longer endure." People v. Johnson, 2 Wheeler's C.C. 361, 389 (N.Y. 1824).
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with the method used to arouse the conscience.2 5 The content of the confession-
its reference to verifiable corroborative circumstantial evidence and its calm and
composed recitals-was ample proof of its truth. Its truth was ample proof that
the guilty conscience had caused its utterance, i.e. that it was voluntary.26
The current requirement of "fairness" in pre-arraignment dealings between
the police and the suspect make future convictions on uncorroborated confes-
sions unlikely. In effect, it extends the mantle of judicial due process to the po-
lice station and compels police officers to behave as if they were in the court-
rcom.27 Psychological devices to "break" the suspect, such as stripping him
and forcing him to stand naked for hours before a battery of fully clothed ques-
tioners, are unfair.28 Failing to inform the suspect of his right to counsel, to
immediate arraignment, to remain silent is unfair.2 9 Keeping him in solitary
confinement or in prolonged custody without opportunity to communicate with
his friends, family or attorney, is unfair.30 Torturing or coercing his mind by
accusatorial interrogation, even if accomplished through subtle psychiatric inter-
views, is unfair.81. Due process is offended by confessions so obtained not be-
cause they may be false or the result of illegal acts, but because a civilized com-
munity such as ours will not stoop to any form of mental or physical torture to
prove its case against the criminal.8 2 Justice will be done, we proclaim, with
25 People v. Mummiani, n. 14, p. 412; People v. Defore, 242 N.Y 13, 19 (1926) cert. denied,
270 U.S. 657 (1926); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928)-a standard
which would forbid the reception of evidence if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by
government officials would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been
known heretofore." Lisenba v. California, n. 3, p. 235-due process does not apply to pretrial
proceedings. Contra: in the federal courts when the confession was obtained during prolonged
pre-arraignment detention. n. 21.
26 People v. Doran, n. 13, p. 422.
27 Where a defendant may not be tricked or coerced into pleading guilty to a crime. Matter
of Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 25 (1943); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942).
Or permitted to plead guilty without aid of counsel, unless first advised by the court of his
right to counsel and intelligently waiving that right. People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 296
(1951); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
465 (1938).
28 Malinski v. New York, n. 7, p. 405, 432.
29 Harris v. South Carolina, n. 3, p. 70; Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844, 845 (1950).
80 Chambers v. Florida, n. 7, p. 239 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940);
White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631 (1940), 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Watts v. Indiana, n. 3, p. 53;
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 64 (1949); Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881 (1950),
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942); People v. Snyder, 297 N.Y. 81, 90 (1947);
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945)--denial of right to counsel vitiates a plea of guilty on
arraignment and sentence thereon. Contra: Gallegos v. Nebraska, n. 18-prolonged detention,
lack of counsel are "elements" to be considered in determining whether due process has been
violated; but the test is solely the confession's "voluntariness."
81 Watts v. Indiana, n. 3, p. 52, 54; People v. Leyra, n. 23-hypnotism by psychiatrist claimed.
Contra: when pyschiatrist advises accused "you need not say one word if you don't want to
speak to us." People v. Fernandez, 301 N.Y. 302, 332 (1950).
S2 Lisenba v. California, n. 3, p. 235, 236; Lyons v. Oklahoma, n. 4, p. 605; Haley v. Ohio,
n. 3, p. 600; Rouchin v. California,-U.S.-(1952) -the community's "sense of fair play and dc-
cency" is offended and its "conscience" is shocked by such tactics. Contra: Reed, J. concurring
in United States v. Mitchell, n. 9, p. 71: "The juristic theory under which a confession is ad-
mitted or barred is bottomed on its testimonial trustworthiness."
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"evidence independently secured thru skillful investigation and not out of the
mouth of the accused," 83 unless he wanders into the station house and begs the
police for punishment.3 4 The effect of such chivalry is to outlaw most confes-
sions obtained during pre-arraignment detentions and require the police to
"stand by helplessly while those suspected of (an unwitnessed) murder prowl
about unmolested." 35 It enables the experienced criminal to go free and limits
convictions and punishment to those inexperienced in legal maneuvers or suffi-
ciently inept to have left behind convincing external evidence of their connection
with the crime.
This enshrinement of "fairness" in the contest between the community and
the suspected perpetrator of the unwitnessed crime is a strange anomaly in our
law. In all other contacts between the community and the individual, the latter
must suffer inconveniences and even hardships if required by the general wel-
fare. He must risk his life on the battlefield, conform his personal conduct to the
standards of the community, contribute his property and the product of his la-
bors to the common good.36 His constitutional or statutory privilege against
self-incrimination is not a right "basic to our society," of which he must be ad-
vised by his interrogator. It is deemed waived unless affirmatively claimed in
response to every question calling for an incriminating answer. 37 It may not be
claimed if the forum has by statute granted complete immunity from prosecution
for the crime that might be revealed by the incriminating answer,38 although
such immunity granted by a state does not prevent federal prosecution for the
admitted offense and vice versa.3 9 It may be infringed by the states without vio-
lating due process. 40 It applies only to oral or written utterances and does not
33 Watts v. Indiana, n. 3, p. 54.
34 Ohio v. Higgins, NY Times 4/13/51-defendant told Nassau County (N.Y.) police that
he poisoned his wife's glass of wine at East Liverpool, Ohio, eight days before her death on Jan.
27, 1941 but had never been questioned about the case, which had been listed as a suicide. His
reason for confessing: "I can't sleep. I keep thinking about it. I want it off my chest. I feel much
better off now."
36 Watts v. Indiana, n. 3, p. 61-2 (Jackson, J. dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas believes all
confessions obtained during prolonged pre-arraignment interrogation should be inadmissible, be.
cause the substitution of police inquisition or protective custody for the safeguards of a hearing
before a magistrate is a denial of due process. Agoston v. Pennsylvania, n. 29, p. 845; Watts
v. Indiana, n. 3, p. 57; Harris v. South Carolina, n. 3, p. 73; Turner v. Pennsylvania, n. 30, p. 67.
36 50 USC App. 454; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Hamilton v. Regents,
293 U.S. 245 (1934); Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) ; Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300- U.S. 379 (1937); Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138 (1948); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Home Building & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); United States v.
Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
37 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); People v. Kennedy, 159 N.Y. 346, 360
(1899)-an accused of ordinary intelligence is presumed to know that he may remain silent
when interrogated by the police.
88 Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244 (1931).
33 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944).
40 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947); Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326
(1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908) ; N.Y. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
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prevent compulsory physical examinations, bloodtests, fingerprinting, search of
the person or seizure of incriminating papers. 41 His right of privacy does not
guarantee against "the knock at the door" or against a search or an arrest for
which a warrant could not have been obtained. It may be invaded by law enforce-
ment officers who believe he has violated our criminal laws and the time is ripe
"to close the trap" on him.42 They may hold him at will as a material witness
while determining whether he is also the perpetrator of the crime.48 They may
convict him on evidence obtained in violation of statutes forbidding wiretapping
and constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches. 44 Such procedures
are "fair" because the welfare of our society demands them, because our com-
munity cannot maintain an ordered existence without them. "Fairness" in these
matters is not an abstract ideal but the practical result of giving primary con-
sideration to the needs of the community.
When a confession which may send an individual to the gallows is involved,
"fairness" becomes a reflection of the emotional reactions of the appellate judg-
es.45 To compel a man to give evidence against himself in a state proceeding in
which he is later convicted of using the mails to defraud, raises a question of the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment, which can be discussed with comparative
dispassion. 46 But to compel him to answer extrajudicial interrogations in a police
station on which he may later be convicted of first degree murder, presents an
entirely different situation. This is indecent behavior, procedure unworthy of a
nation priding itself on its respect for individuals as persons. 47 Or it is coercion
41 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252, 253 (1910); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67
(C.A. 2nd, 1932). Cf., Rochin v. California, n. 32-use of a stomach pump to obtain incrimi-
nating evidence is not compulsory self-incrimination but a shocking, brutal and "unfair" method
of coercing a confession, and therefore a violation of due process. The "brutality" of the use
of a stomach pump to obtain that organ's contents seems akin to the "inhumanity" sometimes
ascribed to vivisection by its opponents. Stomach pumps are constantly used by hospital nurses
to obtain gastric juice, bile or pancreatic juice for examination. As a rule, it is a simple procedure
not requiring the supervision of a physician. Blumgarten, A TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, 294, 295
(1927).
42 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950) ; Olmstead v. United States n. 25, p.
468; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) ; People v. Defore, n. 25, p. 24.
48 Gross v. Sheriff, 302 N.Y. 173 (1951) ; People v. Perez, n. 22, p. 217.
44 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904); In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (D.C.
Tex., 1949)-stomach pump an unreasonable search but evidence obtained by state officers there-
by admissible in federal courts; People v. Defore, n. 25-wiretapping; State v. Mara, 78 A.2d
922, 924 (N.H. 1951) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33, 39 (1949)-where the states permit-
ting such use are tabulated. Contra: in the federal courts if evidence illegally obtained by federal
officers: Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937) ; Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949); Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199, 205 (Del. 1950).
45 Haley v. Ohio, n. 3, p. 603-whether a confession is admissible "invites a psychological judg-
ment that reflects deep, even if inarticulate, feelings of our society." Rochin v. California, n. 32-
the requirement of "fairness" makes admissibility of a confession "turn on the idiosyncracies
of the judges who sit" in the appellate court.
46 Feldman v. United States, n. 39.
47 Haley v. Ohio, n. 3, p. 600; Rochin v. California, n. 32.
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which due process forbids as basis of a conviction.48 Or it is proper and neces-
sary police procedure, without which unwitnessed crimes would remain unsolved. 49
No court has ever veered from the juristic principle that non-compelled,
non-coerced, purely voluntary testimony is admissible. Witnesses must be sworn
on a Bible or object of similar meaning to them and publicly acknowledge their
awareness that a supernatural power will puhish them if they testify falsely. Those
who do not believe in a supernatural power or that such punishment will follow
false testimony, must be sworn in the mode equally solemn and obligatory t3
them. 50 Although it is well-known that "fools and children" cannot stick to an
invented story when closely questioned, 51 receipt of their unsworn testimony is
reversible error.52 All humans must be placed in fear of punishment by their God
or temporal authorities before they will be heard in a judicial proceeding. 58
Dying declarations are admitted only upon proof that the declarant then
believed his death certain and imminent; was so "impressed with the awful idea
of approaching dissolution" that the usual human feelings influencing testi-
mony, such as malice, hatred, and passion, were "overwhelmed and banished."5 4
Even if spoken in the "hush of death's impending presence," these declara-
tions are admissible only in trials for murder, manslaughter or abortion; elsewhere
they are of no testimonial value because unsworn. 56
Living witnesses are reminded that temporal punishment for perjury will also
be inflicted upon them, if they testify falsely. When subpoenaed, they must take±
the stand and answer the questions asked of them. If they claim their answers
will show their commission of a crime, the court may excuse them from such
answers. But if there is an adequate immunity statute in effect, or if they waived
immunity to keep their jobs as public officers, they must answer.56 If they still re-
fuse, th'eir testimony will be compelled by imprisonment for contempt of court.
The statements made by persons thus compelled to speak and threatened with
divine and temporal punishment if they do not speak the truth are the only
48 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, n. 4, p. 154; Lyons v. Oklahoma, n. 4, p. 607 (Murphy, J. dis-
senting). Cf., Jackson, J. dissenting in Ashcraft, p. 161-"arrest itself is inherently coercive, and
so is detention."
49 Watts v. Indiana, n. 3, p. 58 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
50 See for example N.Y. Civil Practice Act, § 360 et seq. All judicial forums have similar statutes.
51 People v. Johnson, 185 N.Y. 219, 231 (1906).
52 Gehl v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 156 App. Div. 51 (N.Y. 2nd 1913); Salmon v.
Sunday, 134 Misc. 475 (N.Y. App. T. 1st, 1929). N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure, § 392, per-
mits unsworn testimony of a child under 12 years of age in certain criminal prosecutions, it sup-
ported by other evidence. But the court must be satisfied that the child knows it is "wrong" to
lie and that false testimony will be punished. People v. Linzey, 79 Hun 23 (N.Y. 1894).
53 Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 573 (1901)-unsworn utterances are without value as
proof of their truth because they are unsworn.
64 People v. Sarzano, 212 N.Y. 231, 234 (1914) ; Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 99 (1933).
55 People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 145 (1915); N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure, § 398a.
56 People ex rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282, 284 (N.Y. 2nd, 1940); People ex rel.
Hofsaes v. Warden, 302 N.Y. 403 (1951) ; 18 U.S.C. 3486 grants immunity to witnesses testi-
fying before Congress or any joint congressional committee. N.Y. Penal Law, 1§ 381, 584, 996,
give automatic immunity to those subpoenaed to testify in anarchy, bribery, gambling and kid-
napping investigations.
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ones we feel "safe" in receiving in our courtrooms. So basic is this concept of com-
pulsion and coercion as a prerequisite for truthful testimony, that favorable wit-
nesses are usually asked by trial counsel whether they have appeared pursuant to
subpoena; neither judge nor jury must entertain the thought that such supporting
evidence was voluntarily given. In the courtroom, we conclusively assume that
voluntary testimony is not necessarily truthful, so that fear of punishment for
perjury is necessary to insure a probability of truth. There, involuntary testimony
is not conclusively or even presumptively false. It is never "unfair," although it is
well-known that many witnesses feel terrified and coerced by courtroom procedure. 57
Courtroom compulsion and coercion may not be used against an ac-
cused because of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, and
similar guarantees in state constitutions and statutes. If an accused is forced to
take the witness's oath and testify, his statements may not be used to prove the
crime.
While the constitutional and statutory provisions are applicable only to
judicial proceedings,5 8 the humane principle behind them and the historic abuses
prompting their enactment have affected the acceptance or rejection of extra-
judicial admissions of guilt. The early confession cases held the admonitions of
police and complaining witness to "tell the truth" just as compelling and coercive
as the subpoena and the oath.59 The accused could not be forced to incriminate
himself in Court; therefore, he would not be forced to incriminate himself
elsewhere. When the prosecution depended upon the extrajudicial incrim-
inating statement obtained without courtroom compulsion or coercion, courts
evolved the theory of "purely voluntary mental action." Proof that the accused
was under arrest when he confessed, or had been told that it "would be better
for him to own up," automatically vitiated the confession.6 0 "The human mind is
'easily seduced," they said in explanation of rejection of such incriminating state-
ments. "In the alarm of danger, humans are liable to acknowledge indiscriminate-
ly a falsehood or a truth, as different agitations may prevail."' 1 Lacking objective
proof of the state of mind of the accused when he made the confession, some
courts excluded all incriminating statements which might have been induced by
external suggestion, threat, promise or "influence." 62 Other courts admitted all
incriminating statements not shown to have been induced by threats or promises
of the temporal authorities of such force as to deprive the accused of his "free-
67 Shientag, TRIAL OF A CIVIL JURY ACTION 63 (1938)-There is some perjury, but for the
most part false testimony is due to defective observation, inability to state accurately what was in
fact observed, faulty recollection, unconscious partisanship or suggestion, the tendency to exagger-
ate and to resort to the imagination."
58 Wood v. United States, n. 16, p. 268; Adams v. New York, n. 44, p. 598.
59 Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 552-7, 559-61 (1897); People v. Phillips, 42 N.Y.
200, 202-3 (1870).
60 People v. Phillips, n. 59; People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211, 221 (1886).
61 Brain v. United States, n. 59, p. 547.
62 Brain v. United States, n. 59, p. 542, 564; Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-5 (1924)-
"whatever may have been the character of the compulsion."
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dom of will or self control." 63 This freedom the accused was presumed to have
retained during police custody, interrogation and warning that countless witness-
es were available to prove the crime, so he might "just as well tell the truth. '" 4
Since the former approach would exclude most confessions, state courts gradually
adopted the latter.
From the conflicting testimony oht the nature of the claimed coercing threats
and promises and the conditions under which the confession was made, juries
determined whether the accused was guilty or innocent. In spite of judges' charges
to them to disregard the confession induced by physical violence, thr'eats or prom-
ises overpowering the free will of the accused, juries returned guilty verdicts
in the face of third-degree police methods dangerously resembling the seventeenth
century torture by the rack. Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed such convictions. 65 But it did not accept the theory of the early cases that
the suspect could not be forced to incriminate himself; 66 nor the theory that fear
may cause an accused to confess a crime he did not commit; nor the federal rule
outlawing evidence obtained by illegal methods. Instead, the Supreme Court estab-
lished the "unfairness" theory, foreclosing the police from using trickery, prolong-
ed examination or other devices, irrespective of their effect or noneffect on the
mind of the accused or their legality under state statutes and decisions. It invalidated
the true, voluntary confession if "unfairly" obtained.
Until police officers are relieved of their duty to be "active and diligent in
securing confessions" and evidence sufficient to insure the holding of a guilty
suspect by the committing magistrate, 67 and confessions obtained during pre-
arraignment interrogation are completely outlawed, each confessing defendant will
litigate the validity of his confession. Particularly if he is represented by the alert,
devoted attorney to whom he is entitled. 68 Judicial knowledge of the etiology of
confessions would seem a prerequisite to the determination of the fairness or unfai-
ness of the methods now used to obtain them.
The once prevalent theory that truth is spontaneous69 and comes without
conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort which
63 Wilson v. United States, n. 1, p. 622.
64 People v. Kennedy, n. 37, p. 360.
65 Brown v. Mississippi, n. 40, p. 285-6; "The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted
for the witness stand."
66 Cf., Black, J. dissenting in Feldman v. United States, n. 39, p. 499-"Compulsion of self-
incriminatory testimony by court oaths and by the less refined methods of torture were equally de-
tested by the Fifth Amendment." Cf., Black, J. and Douglas, J. concurring in the result in Rochin
v. California, n. 32-evidence obtained by coercing testimony or forcibly using a stomach pump
are inadmissible because they constitute compelled self-incrimination, not because of "unfair-
ness.
67 See n. 2.
68 Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Gibbs v.
Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
62 Contemporaneous admissions or denials of guilt are competent evidence as part of the res
gastae. The utterer is deemed to have been laboring under the excitement and strain of his act.
with no time to deliberate or fabricate.
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is reflected in a rise in systolic blood pressure, has never received judicial or medical
recognition. 0 Both parts of the theory are fallacious. The spontaneity of truth de-
pends on the particular truism, the societal attitude toward its substance, and the
characteristics of the utterer.
Novelists tell us that in bygone days no respectable wife blurted out her
state of pregnancy. She knitted dainty garments and awaited interrogations. Only
when sufficiently prodded did she reluctantly, modestly, and with a becoming
blushb71 (and no change in blood pressure) admit the truth. If such a truth was
spontaneously uttered, the utterer was not a lady. Even today, our culture en-
courages and demands falsehood in daily life. Suppression of the truth is socially
desirable in winning friends, keeping jobs, getting along with neighbors.
A gossamer line divides the falsehoods condoned and condemned by the
community. A large segment of our people, including some of our most esteemed
artists and physicians, do not regard truth as an absolute goal or lying as an evil
per se. For them there are "acceptable social forms" of lies "that anybody with
any intelligence uses all the time."1 2 A sizable majority would rather lie out of a
situation than courageously face it.78 Should childhood teachings cause occassional
twinges of conscience, they satisfy that twinge by taking "into consideration the
nature of the lie and why it was told, to whom it was told, and his reaction to the
lie."74 Even persons trained to distinguish between fact and fancy are able to
indulge in such self-deception that their courtroom oath to tell the truth means for
them an oath to tell the fanciful story they have deceived themselves into be-
lieving to be the truth. 75 Systolic blood pressure may rise with conscious effort
but also rises with unconscious effort and for many other reasons. 76 Statements
made while und'er the influence of "truth-telling" drugs have been dismissed as
"clap trap, unworthy of serious consideration."77
70 Frye v. United States. 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (C.A.D.C.. 1923); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 206 (1938); State v. Lowry, 163 Kans. 622, 628 (1947). Contra: People v. Kenny, 167
Misc. 51 (Queens County Court, N.Y., 1938). It is akin to the once prevalent procedure of re-
qiuiring the suspect to touch the corpse of the murdered man. People v. Johnson, n. 24, p. 378;
State v. Storms, 85 N.W. 610, 612 (Iowa, 1901). Hamlet used a similar device to ascertain the
Ydentitv of the murderer of his father.
71 Blushing is the effect of failure of the cutaneous blood vessels or capillaries to hold their
bloody contents in place. These escape into the surrounding tissue. If the flush is sufficiently
intense and prolonged, hives develop. Embarrassment mixed with resentment accompanies the
vasodilatation and "blush" reaction, LIFE STRESS AND BODILY DISEASE, published by the Asso-
ciation for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease, p. 1006-7 (1950).
72 Expert opinion testimony of Carl A. L. Binger in United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822
(C.A. 2d, 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 948 (1951), Transcript, p. 2689.
73 40 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIME 135, 136, 142, 143 (1949).
7'4 N. 72, Transcript, p. 2698.
75 Toledano & Lasky, SEEDS OF TREASON (1950), details the tragedy of Alger Hiss (n. 72) who
carried self-deception or lying to a disastrous extreme. The testimony of Binger, n. 72, indicates
that he, too, may have been indulging in self-deception in formulating his expert opinion.
76 Op. cit. n. 71, pp. 775-983.
77 State v. Hudson, 289 S.W. 920, 921 (Mo., 1926); People v. Wochnick, 219 P.2d 70
(Calif., 1950); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 (1949); People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 398
(1942). Confession of guilt obtained by hypnotism outlawed as "unfair." People v. Leyra, n. 23.
Proof of innocence obtained by hypnotism outlawed as "illegal." People v. Ebanks, 117 Calif.
652, 665 (1897).
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The guilty conscience clamoring to be confessed was once thought to be a man-
ifestation of the "grand system of Providence, by which guilt is lodged in the
intent."78 Whether the confessor actually committed the crime to which he con-
fessed or only intended to commit it was immaterial to Providence, which con-
sidered him equally punishable in either event. When the law accepted such a con-
fession as proof of guilt, it was carrying out its own system if the crime was com-
mitted or the providential system if, the crime was merely intended. 79
Today's phychiatrists believe that the criminal's guilty conscience is a gen-
eral feeling of guilt-pevalent in certain types of neurotics, hysterics and schizo-
phrenics-driving the affected individual to seek out punishment. His inner need
for suffering, we are told, propels him to commit a crime or merely imagine he
has committed it. He wishes to be punished not for the crime he has actually or
fancifully committed but in appeasement of his craving for punishment per se.80
Such an individual may confess a crime he did not commit.81 Recognition of the
impelling force of the general feeling of guilt, which drives "men readily to accuse
themselves of all kinds of iniqquiry, suspect th'emselves of crimes which they have
never committed, urge some to the most false confessions whilst they were extract-
ed from others by the dread of torture or the tedious misery of the dungeon" re-
sulted in the juristic requirement of proof of the corpus delicti.82 But this proof
merely gave the court the same facts on which the neurotically guilty built his false
confession. It was not proof that he committed the crime nor did it disprove his
mentally abnormal state.
The nonpsychotic, nonneurotic individual has no urge of self-destruction,
self-condemnation or punishment. If crime is his way of life, he has no con-
sciousness of having wronged the community; the law he is accused of violating is
nonexistent for him.83 Neither the psychological nor the ecclesiastical guilty
conscience would cause such a person to confess. He must be provoked or trapped
into an admission of guilt.84 Common sense, history, judicial and medical experi-
ence show that we are engaged in wishful thinking when we rely on an invisible,
subjective compulsion for proof of the perpetration of the unwitnessed crimL. When
such a compulsion does exist, it is a phenomenon of which the law should be
wary. Without independent, corroborative evidence connecting the confessor with
78 Wharton, op. cit. n. 24, p. 20.
79 [Judicial processes and execution chambers may not be used today to enforce the providential
system U. S. CONST. Amend. 1; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McCollum
v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).]
80 Abrahamsen, CRIME AND THE HUMAN MIND 32-3, (1945).
81 People v. Buffom, n. 22, p. 57; People v. Johnson, n. 24, p. 382, refers to State v. Boom
(Vt., 1819), in which two brothers confessed to the murder of their brother-in-law in stfficient
detail to enable corroboration by circumstantial evidence. The brother-in-law appeared in time to
intercept the execution of one of the confessed murderers. Forty years later, Boorn confessed to the
same murder in Ohio, claimed that he had escaped punishment by impersonating the brother-in-
law. Similar instances of such delusory confessions appear in Wharton, op. cit. n. 24, p. 17 et seq.
82 Wharton, op. cit. n. 24, p. 23-4.
83 Op. cit. n. 80, p. 60-1, 137.
84 43 ILL. L. REv. 442, 450 (1948).
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the specific crime to which he confesses, there is no known method of determining
whether the confession is true or false.85 Nor is such a man free to admit or deny
the deed or remain silent. Under both psychological and ecdesiastical explanations
of the guilty conscience, the subjective compulsion is more coercive and productive
of "involuntary" confessions than prolonged interrogation or psychiatric devices.
No sane person will voluntarily choose the electric chair or life imprisonment
with full knowledge and realization that he cannot be convicted or punished unless
he confesses. When faced with a confession made under emotional stress, moral
compulsion, irresistible impulse or police interrogation, he will usually deny the
truth of the confession or endeavor to excuse the homicide.86 Our entire political
philosophy is premised on man's desire to survive and live without restraint.87 The
question before the community, confronted with an unwitnssed murder and a
suspect in police custody, is whether it will indict and convict only those harassed
by a subjective compulsion which they are unable to resist. To reach the criminal,
free of subjective compulsion or sufficiently experienced to resist it, prolonged
interrogation and psychiatric devices are necessary.
When the use of confessions obtained by such external compulsions was
originally outlawed as "unfair," the actual effect of these activities on the suspect
could not be determined.88 A man's state of mind or feeling, if relevant in a
judicial proceeding, was provable by his contemporaneous declarations of feeling,
his facial expressions, gestures, sounds, or words.89 The jury determined whether
these expressions were "genuine or feigned," i.e. involuntary bodily reactions
or voluntary conscious motions made for their effect on others.9 0 When a man's
thought or memory was relevant, the jury determined whether his testimony on
"what he thought or what he did or did not remember" was true or false. If the
jury did not believe his claimed loss of memory, and concluded that events he
swore he "did not remember" were at that time within his knowledge and recol-
lection, he could be convicted of perjury.9 1 The state of mind or feeling of a
truthful man was what he said it was; the state of mind or feeling of an untruth-
ful man was what the opposing litigant claimed it was. Even appellate judges
86 N. 72, Transcript, p. 2594, 2595, 2889; 2689-it may be mere "boasting."
86 People v. French, 12 Calif. 2d 720, 732 (1939) ; People v. Leyra, n. 23; People v. Worthing-
ton, 105 Calif. 166, 172 (1894); Williams v. State, 226 P.2d 989, 993-(Okla., 1951).
87 Preamble to DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
98 Haley v. Ohio, n. 3, p. 606: "Unhappily we have neither physical nor intellectual weights
and measure by which judicial judgment can determine when pressures in securing a confession
reach the coercive intensity that calls for the exclusion of a statement so secured." Therefore, said
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, we must rely on the court's "psychological judgment" of the feelings
of our society.
89 Shepard v. United States, n. 54, p. 104; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285,
295 (1892) ; Matter of Kennedy, 167 N.Y. 163, 173 (1901).
90 Op. cit. n. 57, p. 51-2-"the state of a man's mind is as much a fa* as the state of his di-
gestion." Here the law obliquely recognizes that a "state of mind" or "feeling" is a bodily re-
action over which the individual has no control. Cf., People v. Eurich, 278 App. Div. 717 (N.Y.
2d, 1951)-jury competent to determine whether automobile driver had "concern for others"
from his remarks as he took the wheel.
91 People v. Doody, 172 N.Y. 165, .173 (1902).
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determined state of mind or feeling by their emotional appraisal of the veracity of
the individual involved.92 His statement that he was in fear or in pain was ac-
cepted as proof that the act complained of did in fact terrorize or cause him pain.93
No scientific tests were available to contradict him, to gauge the amount of his
fair or pain, to establish or refute their connection with the claimed causative act.
Current experiments at the New York Hospital and the Cornell Medical Col-
lege in the field of psychosomatics furnish such scientific tests. With delicate ap-
paratus and photography the experimenters are able to observe and record a
man's state of mind or feeling with as much accuracy as the X-ray observes and rc-
cords his bones.94
The experimenters have found that an emotional "feeling" is not something
confined to the brain, mind or nervous system. It is the physical reaction of one
or more organs of the human body to a specific stimulus. Our language has long
recognized the physical nature of feelings: fear took my breath away, made my hair
stand on end, lent wings to my feet; he's a pain in the neck, a headache, a gripe; he
was hot under the collar, pale with rage, in a cold sweat; he has a lump in his
throat, is a stiff-necked fellow, trembled with fear, shook with rage; faint heart
ne'er won fair lady.95 The individual experiencing the "feeling" may be con-
scious of some of the visceral reactions, such as a constriction in the middle of the
,cbst ("butterflies in the stomach") or nausea. Usually he is unaware that his
body is reading. He may be, able to identify the effective stimulus. Usually he
attributes the reactions of which he is aware to stimuli producing no "feeling" in
him but only in his neighbor, whom he strives to 'emulate. The intensity of his "feel-
ing" or bodily reaction does not depend on his consciousness of the reaction or his
identification of the stimulus, but on the significance of the stimulus to him.9 6
This, in turn, is the cumulative result of his past experiences, of the problems and
conflicts encountered by him during his life.9 7
92 People v. Samuels, 284 N.Y. 410, 417 (1940)-witness hedging at the trial of the indict-
ment obtained on his unequivocal grand jury testimony, held not guilty of perjury but suffering
from fallibility of memory; State v. Driver, 88 W.Va. 479, 488 (1921)-medical opinion that
the complaining witness was a liar disregarded on the ground that opinion evidence of veracity
must be founded on knowledge of the witness' reputation for truth in the community. United
States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (D.C.N.Y., 1950), permitted psychiatric testimony that a witness
was suffering from a mental disease symptomatized. by "chronic, persistent and repetitive lying"
(n. 72, transcript p. 2551). But on cross-examination, the psychiatrist conceded that such diseased
persons also tell the truth (Transcript, p. 2598) and there was no known method of determin-
ing when such a person is testifying truthfully or falsely (Transcript, p. 2594, 2595, 2889).
98 Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N.Y. 228, 237-8 (1892).
94 Op. cit., n. 71. This volume contains detailed reports prepared by 132 experts in the field,
amply supporting the conclusions herein stated.
95 Harris, MODERN TRENDS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE (1948) 3, 5; Wolff, LIFE SITU-
ATIONS, EMOTIONS AND BODILY DISEASE (1951)-address delivered before N.Y. Academy of
Medicine, in press.
96 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 665-73, 1062.
97 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 1079.
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"Feeling" is an objective condition, the Cornell experiments show, as demon-
strable as a break in a bone. It may be accompanied by verbal utterances expressing
the same reactions as the organs of the body. 98 While individuals have power to
control their verbal manifestations of "feeling" and utter words falsifying it, they
cannot control the bodily manifestations of their "feeling." They can alter their
true "feeling" only by changing their attitude toward the stimulus to which their
body is reacting. 99 If a man is really afraid, angry, resentful, anxious, one or more
organs of his body will express that fact so that a trained medical observer can see
the feeling and its intensity. By adroit verbal discussions, the physician can de-
termine the type of situation being felt, and the aspect most affectively significant
and can intensify or diminish the feeling and even eliminate it.100
As the result of his training and professional experiences, a lawyer may be-
come angry, resentful or agonized by subterfuge, insincerity, falsehood or double-
dealing. If this attitude is sufficiently entrenched in him, the mere mention of the
name of a friend or relative believed by him to be guilty of such traits will produce
reactions of anger, resentment or anxiety in one or more organs of his body. A
physician-because of his training and professional experiences-may attach
no importance to falsification. The double-dealing or reminders of it, resulting
in a violent reaction or "feeling" in the lawyer's body, will then produce none
in the physician's. Outwardly and consciously, both men may appear to be affected
similarly by the mention of the falsifier's name. And yet the lawyer may be ex-
periencing bodily reactions or "feelings" which, if repeated too often, will damage
or destroy the reacting organ; the physician will be "feeling" nothing. A filing
clerk, to whom the esteem of his employer and retention of his employment were of
major importance, experienced stomach reactions and feelings of fear when ac-
cused of misfiling an important document. When upbraided for inefficiency at an
extra-curricular household task, which he believed he had done exceedingly well,
his stomach reaction and feeling was anger at the unjust accusation. 101 Superficial-
ly, the same type of stimulus was twice directed against him; different feelings
resulted because the accusation had different meanings or significances to him.
To him, the first was a threatened interference with his place in his workaday
world, his status as a human being; the second was merely an unjustified criticism.
98 Unpublished results of current experiments, made available for the purpose of this article by
Harold G. Wolff, the leading authority in the United States on psychosomatics, under whose di-
rection the Cornell experiments are being conducted.
99 Sustained bodily manifestations of intense feeling cause diseased conditions, permanent dam-
age and destruction of the affected organs. Illnesses of psychosomatic origin are cured by substi-
tuting new personal and social values, new life goals and different attitudes toward the problems
found responsible for the feelings. Op. cit. n. 71, p. 1090.
100 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 90, 338, 418, 523, 537, 545, 583, 596, 609, 665, 692, 750, 799, 818, 929,
954, 976, 987, 1019.
101 Wolf & Wolff, HUMAN GASTRIC FUNCTION (1943) 112, 118; Harris, op. cit. n. 95, p. 24.
Colored photographs of the stomach's fear and anger reactions or feelings appear in op. cit. n.
71, p. 669. Hypofunctioning of the viscera is the usual fear reaction and hyperfunctioning the
usual anger reaction, when these emotions are experienced singly. The former is the normal be-
havior of a stomach ejecting a poison or other noxious substance; the latter is the normal eating
or digestive state.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
His knowledge or lack of knowledge of his terror at the first accusation and anger
at the second, did not affect his actual feeling or create or alter it. When discussing
with the experimenters the prospective removal of his child and grandchild from
his home to another city, the subject said: "I don't believe my daughter wants
to leave her mother." But his stomach showed that he was angry and resentful
at the removal and did not truly feel the placidity his words indicated.
102
Scientifically, "feeling" is not provable by the testimony of the affected
individual or the opinion of a lay observer. "A man's state of mind like the state
of his digestion is a question of fact,"' 0 8 but not one determinable by a lay jury or
judge on the man's testimony of his feelings or testimonial demeanor. His stomach
may know how he feels, but his stomach will not tell him in language he can un-
derstand; nor will he necessarily know which stimulus caused his stomach to feel
as it does.
The Cornell experimenters are endeavoring to ascertain the cause and cure of
nonmicrobic diseases such as stomach ulcers, ulcerative colitis, diarrhea, arthritis,
diabetes, high blood pressure, convulsions, epilepsy, asthma, hives, goiter, hay fever,
migraine headaches, backaches and sinusitis. In the process, they have given the
law an insight into the conditions we call fear, anger, resentment, anxiety, hostility
and pain. Their published rports show us what a criminal suspect "feels" when he
is "terrorized" and "tortured" by stimuli similar to courtroom or police station
interrogation aid psychiatric interviews;' 04 and what the law-abiding members
of the community "feel" as they meet their daily interpersonal and societal conflicts
and unsolvable problems.
When the scientific evidence of the true feelings of the suspect is examined in
the light of the scientific evidence of the true feelings of the rest of the com-
munity, courts desirous of reaching determinations on factual, rather than emo-
tional, bases cannot continue to outlaw the pre-arraignment confession--obtained
by prolonged police interrogation and psychiatrict devices-on the ground of
"unfairness."
As every amateur woodsman has discovered to his sorrow when endeavoring
to touch a resting porcupine, its dart-like quills are easily detached and become em-
bedded in his skin. The fluid ejected by the skunk and the venomous fangs lashed
out by the snake, when similarly approached, soon teach the amateur to keep his
distance in their vicinity. The human body reacts in comparable ways to whatever
threatens a man's security, values and goals; and to words or other symbols of
such threats. Conflicts with friends, relatives, business associates, employers, em-
ployees, customers, tax collectors,, policemen and his own desires or dreams of
102 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 672.
108 Paraphrasing Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885), quoted in op. cit.
n. 57, p. 51.
104 People v. Leyra, n. 23, held that a confession made to a psychiatrist employed by the police,
but believed by the defendant to be curing his sinus headache, was obtained by "torture of the
mind" which "is just as contrary to inherent fairness and basic justice as torture of the body." The
defendant claimed the psychiatrist hypnotized him.
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what he wishes to be, are among the situations to which a man's viscera will react
by defensive and offensive activity.105 His body will react to a threatening problem
as to an invading or threatening person, parasite or poison.
The law has long recognized that a man's arm and fist may strike out in de-
fense against a threatened corporeal assault. The Cornell experiments show that
his viscera may engage in similar defense against a threatened incorporeal assault.
Individuals differ in their approaches to such threats. Some retreat and withdraw
to cover, some evade and ignore, some attack and fight. Some react in one way
during their youth and in another at maturity. Some detect threats in situations
which others find reassuring or inconsequential. Some become conditioned and
indifferent to an oft-repeated threat; some react more vigorously with each repeti-
tion.*06 These reactions we know as emotions or feelings of fear, anger, hate,
hostility, resentment, anxiety and indifference. They are experienced by all men
in the course of their daily living, as they strike ruts and obstructions in the form
of frustrations. Men become frightened by the loss of their jobs, angered by their
friends, resentful of their neighbors, hostile to their relatives or depressed by their
own lack of achievement. If more than superficial, these emotions are expressed
in hypofunctioning or hyperfunctioning of one or more organs of the body. Us-
ually only one organ behaves abnormally.
Such abnormal functioning or bodily reaction and "feeling" does not affect
speech, locomotion or carriage, unless endured for years. It would not be evident
in a phonographic, wire or tape recording or sound motion picture of a normal
defendant in the act of confessing.'
0 7
The effect of intense fear, terror and alarm on the human body was observed
by a Dutch physician, who attended the medical needs of a number of his pre-war
patients while they were incarcerated in a Nazi concentration camp during World
War II. Before their imprisonment, they had been respected, successful merchants
and professional persons, suffering from stomach ulcers. In the concentration
camp they were subjected to indignations, deprivations, physical and mental tor-
ture and threats. They never knew at the beginning of the day whether they would
still be alive at sundown. There was endless interrogation, marching, use by their
captors of every device thought to break a man's spirit. And yet they lost all mani-
festations of their peptic ulcerations. A group of Far East missionaries, suffering
from severe migraine headaches prior to the war, lost their headaches while incar-
cerated in a Japanese concentration camp. In spite of the physical and mental
105 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 1059.
106 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 1063-4; 90-112.
107 Contemporaneous recordings have been accepted as conclusive refutation of threats and
coercion by the police in obtaining the confession. State v. Perkins, 355 Mo. 851 (1947); Peo-
ple v. Hayes, 21 Calif. App. 2d 320 (1937); Williams v. State, n. 86, p. 994; Commonwealth
v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930); Commonwealth v. Clark, 123 Pa. Super. 277 (1936).
The tape recording of the confession to the psychiatrist in People v. Leyra, n. 23, sounded normal
and natural; the jury and trial court accepted the confession as voluntary and non-coerced, but
the appellate court found "torture of the mind" and unfairness. See n. 104.
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torture to which they were subjected, and their well-grounded fear of their cap-
tors, they emerged from their imprisonment minus their pre-war illness, for which
a.n American physician had been treating them.108 In the Dutch merchants and
the Far East missionaries, the stresses and strains of their normal civilian life were
more intensely "felt" than the horrors of the concentration camp. For them, the
constant striving to gain the esteem of their neighbors and maintain their positions
in their business and social communities were threats felt more keenly and dis-
astrously than the tortures of wartime imprisonment. The merchants' stomachs
reacted to the civilian threats by overactivity. The mucous lining became engorged,
bloody and finally ulcerated. Which is the way the bodies of many people react to
protracted conflicts causing them anger, anxiety, hostility and resentment. 109 The
missionaries reacted to their civilian threats by a dilatation or swelling of the
blood vessels and large arteries of the head, the thumping or abnormal pulsation
of which is felt as a severe migraine headache. Such is the bodily reaction of many
people to situations causing them anger, resentment, hostility and humiliation. 1 0
When reacting to intense fear, the affected bodily organ usually hypofunc-
tions. The stomach stops its normal digestive processes and goes thru the rou-
tines producing belching, heartburn, lack of appetite, nausea, distention and vomit-
ing. It reacts similarly at times of great disappointment, discouragement and sad-
ness. When the conditions producing the fear reactions are terminated, the stomach
returns to its normal state."' No transitory or permanent injury to the stomach re-
sults, such as the peptic ulcerations following the hyperfunctioning reaction to sit-
uations producing anger, hostility and resentment. If police interrogations cause
fear, terror and alarm in the criminal suspect and his body reacts to the interroga-
tions via his stomach, he may become nauseated and vomit. But he will not suffer
with stomach ulcers as do the law-abiding citizens who react to the conflicts of
their daily life via their stomachs.
When intense fear is felt in the intestines, they will stop their normal func-
tioning and produce the condition known as constipation."12 When the more ag-
gressive emotions-anger, hostility and resentment-are felt in the intestines, there
iF an engorgement of their mucous lining, bleeding, diarrhea and eventually ulcera-
tive colitis. Here again the criminal suspect affected by fear runs no risk of tempor-
ary or permanent internal injury, while the citizen reacting to the stresses of his
daily life via his intestines will be seriously incapacitated.
The skin "feels" intense fear by becoming cold and wet, as the cutaneous
blood vessels or capillaries constrict. When the conditions inducing the feeling
of fear are altered, the skin returns to its normal condition. But the man who re-
108 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 1079-80, 612; Wolff, HEADACHE AND OTHER HEAD PAIN 341-2 (1948).
The stomach ulcers and migraine headaches recurred when the patients were released from
the concentration camps and resumed their normal business and missionary activities.
109 Op. cit. n. 101, p. 161-74; op. cit. n. 71, p. 656-73.
110 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 609-14; Wolff, op. cit. n. 108, p. 266-98, 314.
111 Op. cit. n. 101, p. 112-5, 128.
112 OP. cit. n. 71, p. 679-730, 1065-8.
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acts to his interpersonal, business or societal difficulties via his skin will develop
hives or eczema, both irritating and painful diseases. 118 Here again, the criminal
susspect being interrogated at the police station and feeling intense fear by skin
reactions sustains a possible discomfort as against the severe abnormalities suffer-
ed by the law-abiding skin reactor.
The "feeling" scale continues to weigh heavily against the law-abiding citizen
exposed to the conflicts of daily life and favors the criminal suspect whose only
irritant is prolonged police interrogation, when their respective circulatory sys-
tems, airways or muscles react or "feel." The anger, resentment, hostility and
anxiety of the citizen appear in his body in the form of high blood pressure, heart
damage, 11 4 hay fever, breathing difficulties, asthma, 115 backaches and vascular
headaches. 116 The terrified criminal suspect may become pale as his blood vessels
constrict; but when the interrogation is completed, his circulatory system will r -
sume its normal state. The mucous membranes of his nasal cavities will not become
red, swollen and dripping with profuse secretions, obstructing his breathing, as
do those of the business man who resents the machinations of his partner. Nor
will his bodily reactions to his interrogators involve inflammation and tearing of
the eyes, tenderness in the cheeks, forehead and sinuses, and give him a painful
sinus headache, as did the hostile reaction of a young hospital physician to the in-
efficiency of his superior. 117 The suspect's fear, if felt by his nose, will cause its
mucous membranes to become dry, blanched and shunken. The more abject his
fear, the more his nasal air passages will widen. While the law-abiding citizen,
or spouse with an officious mother-in-law, reacts to his conflicts by nasal obstruc-
tion, facial pain and sinusitis, the criminal suspect will breathe with ease. 1 8
Until we eliminate the interpersonal and societal conflicts encountered by
each of us in our daily lives, engendering concomitant feelings of anger, resent-
ment, hostility and anxiety in our bodies, the criminal suspect subjected to police
interrogation is more "fairly" treated than we treat ourselves. The only feeling
of his involved in the "fairness" of confessions, is his fear. The rest of the hu-
man emotions are daily experienced by 'each of us, and are accompanied by much
more serious and lasting physical ills than the fear felt by the suspect.
The appellate courts' feeling that it is "unfair" to deprive the arrested sus-
pect of normal sleep and interrogate him during an all-night vigil is similarly with-
out factual basis. A normal, average member of our community piloted an air-
plane across the ocean while foregoing sleep for more than 34 hours. 119 Notable
18 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 987-1015.
114 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 976-83.
115 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 545-81.
116 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 750-71; 605-14.
117 Op. cit. n. 71, p. 545-64; Wolff, n. 95; Holmes, THE NOSE (1950) 62-3, 67-8.
118 Holmes, op. cit. n. 117, 59-60.
119 Charles A. Lindbergh flight of May 20-21, 1927. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee n. 4, p. 150, a
36-hour police interrogation was described by the suspect as an "unbearable strain on his nerves."
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inventors, authors, jurists and actors have made major contributions to our civi-
lization without the usual interruptions for sleep.
For four successive days, three persons daily spent twelve consecutive hours
multiplying four place numbers by four place numbers without aid of pencil
or paper. Before and after each twelve-hour multiplication session, the workers
faced and answered a battery of psychological tests and interrogatories. They
were kept incommunicado during the experiment. At its completion, the four
days seemed to them "like one long nightmare" which they "would not repeat
for $10,000"-a remark duplicated almost verbatim by each defendant challeng-
ing the validity of his pre-arraignment confession. Their final physical exami-
nations showed no signs of unusual physical fatigue; their scores on the arithme-
tical problems gave no evidence of mental fatiguel 20-findings duplicated in
the medical reports supporting challenged pre-arraignment confessions.
What the layman calls "mental fatigue" is actually boredom or monotony.
It does not interfere with the functioning of the normal intellectual processes
and is not painful. Four trained observers tested their pain perception thresholds
every two hours during a twenty-four hour session of compulsory wakefulness.
The thresholds remained normal and constant. Had fatigue deflected their at-
tention, their thresholds would have fluctuated from the norms. 121 They were
as mentally alert at the end of the experiment as at the beginning. That prolong-
ed interrogation at a police station can cause a fatigued suspect to deliver a calm,
coherent narration of a crime he never committed is clearly purple prose with no
scientific support. His fatigue will be physical, not mental. When sufficiently fati-
gued, h'e will fall asleep painlessly.
"Mental torture," like "mental fatigue," is a lay concept unrelated to reali-
ty. It implies the use against the mind or "spirit" of devices eliciting pain, similar
to those once used against the body. The exposure of a criminal suspect, "ex-
hausted" from lack of sleep, to the unrelenting interrogation of a psychiatrist
ostensibly curing him of a sinus headache, is such "torture of the mind."122 The
term was first used by the Supreme Court to describe confessional procedures
abroad;123 later, to support the invalidation of a confession obtained without
physical violence, threats of violence or inducements. 124  "Physical violence
breaks the will to conceal, lie or stand by the truth; th ewill is as much affected
by fear as by force." Therefore, said the court, "there is torture of mind as weli
as body;" prolonged interrogation, while incommunicado, may "torture the mind
120 Blum, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1949) 236-40; 55 Psychological Monographs 5 (1946).
121 PAIN, published by the Assn. for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease 5-6 (1943). This
volume contains the results of experiments on the subject conducted by 37 medical experts. The
pain perception threshold is "the lowest perceptible intensity of pain."
122 People v. Leyra, n. 23.
1238 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, n. 4, p. 155.
124 Watts v. Indiana, n. 3.
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but put no scar on the body."' 2 The court held the use of confessions obtained
by torture of the mind as unfair and repugnant to our notions of decency as the
use of confessions obtained by physical torture. "Torture of the mind" thus
became a judicially-determined painful 'experience, elicited by prolonged ques-
tioning and psychiatric devices, affecting the suspect not only with fear but with
something akin to the pain induced by the torture chambers of medieval days
and more recent concentration camps.
Scientifically, pain is a sensory experience transmitted thru separate nerve
structures similar in function and structure to those conveying sensations of touch,
pressure, heat and cold.' 26 The Cornell experimenters have been able to segre-
gate its physical or sensory aspects from the feelings or bodily reactions following
the sensation. Twitching, blinking, withdrawal, vocal and facial expressions of
displeasure, sweating, high blood pressure, rapid heart action and feet tapping
are such reactions. The pain itself is perceived with like intensity by all normal,
healthy human beings. But their feelings or reactions to pain differ as widely
as their feelings or reactions to the interpersonal and societal conflicts of their
daily lives. With pain, as with stimuli arousing fear, anger, resentment or hos-
tility, a man's feelings or reactions are determined by the significance or mean-
ing of the painful sensation to him. This, again, is governed by his prior life
experiences.' 2 7 With sensitive apparatus and trained physicians as guinea pigs,
twenty-two increments of intensity of pain have been measured between the com-
mon pain threshold and the commencement of tissue damage. All humans per-
ceive these twenty-two degrees of pain-if their nerve structures are intact-be-
tween the first pin prick or other minimal painful stimulus and the final or maxi-
mal stimulus before actual injury occurs. Cutaneous pain is perceived as a prick-
ing or burning sensation; visceral pain as a deep ach'e.' 2 s Pain is the body's
alarm response to threatened or actual physical injury.
Prolonged interrogations, incommunicado custody, psychiatric interviews
and lack of sleep, cannot cause pain. Even verbal threats, promises or induce-
ments cannot cause pain. The nerve structures thru which pain is perceived are
insensible to such stimuli.' 2 9 Feelings or reactions accompanying protracted ques-
tioning are not pain reactions; pain must be perceived by the pertinent nerve
structures before there is any feeling of pain or pain reaction. Medically, there
is no similarity between physical torture of the body and verbal onslaughts upon
125 Watts v. Indiana, n. 3, p. 52, 60. The defendant was interrogated from 5:30 p.m. to 3 a.m.
each day, except Sunday, for one week and then confessed. Jackson, J., dissenting, found no
"torture" in the record.
126 Wolff, PAIN 3 (1948). Pain is there treated as a sixth sense and grouped with sight, hearing,
smell, taste and touch. The author presently is considered "one of the greatest authorities in the
'world on the subject" of pain. Lederle Laboratories, NEWSLETTER FOR THE DENTAL PROFESSION
ON FACIAL PAIN 14 (1951).
127 Op. cit. n. 126, p. 4, 7, 10, 12, 13.
128 Op. cit. n. 126, p. 19, 7.
129 Op. cit. n. 126, p. 15-6; n. 126, and n. 121.
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the mind. The kindergarten ditty: "Sticks and stones will break my bones but
words can never hurt me," is scientifically sound. Words cannot produce the
sensation of pain. On the contrary, when pain already exists, protracted interro-
gations will raise the pain perception threshold and thereby lessen the intensity of
the pain. The criminal suspect suffering from painful sinus headache will per-
ceive less pain during police and psychiatric interrogations; 1380 the verbal de-
vices judicially declared to be torturing will have the same effect on his habitual
pains as an analgetic drug.'3 '
The abnormal behavior of the bodily organs reacting to conflicts, includ-
ing prolonged interrogations, may cause a sensation of pain.132 But such pain
would be much more intense in the law-abiding citizen reacting in anger, re-
sentment and hostility, than in the criminal suspect reacting in fear. The citizen's
bodily reactions or emotional feelings result in engorgement, swelling, inflamma-
tion and dilatation of his mucous membranes and blood vessels. Such conditions
lower the pain perception threshold and thereby increase the intensity of pain.' 33
The suspect's bodily reactions or emotional feelings result in constriction and
contraction of his mucous membranes. Such conditions do not alter the pain
perception threshold or the intensity of pain. Here, too, the suspect is being more
"fairly" treated than the rest of the community.
Stripped of their emotional sugar-coating and examined factually, as all leg-,
ally-operative conditions should be examined, the fears and terrors of the crimi-
nal suspect are the minor physical reactions experienced by all persons exposed
to interrogation by examiners charged with the duty of uncovering the truth.
Some witnesses respond readily and truthfully to questioning; others resist, falsi-
fy or endeavor to outwit the interrogator. In the courtroom, the latter usually suc-
ceed; they cannot be "badgered" or circuitously forced into the truth. But the trial
judge and jury may detect the untruthful testimony and disregard it. The plain-
tiff or prosecutor can prove his case without the defendant's help and in spite
of his refusal to answer the questions put to him, willingly and truthfully. In the
courtroom, the community need not prove its charge against the defending crimi-
nal "out of his own mouth."' 3 4 But prior to arraignment, the community has
no choice when an unwitnessed crime has been committed by a criminal astute
enough to leave no incriminating evidence behind. It must prove its arraignment
case out of the suspect's mouth or set him free.
"Unfairness" is a relative term. We cannot know whether the detained sus-
pect is being "unfairly" treated until we reduce his detention stresses and feel-
180 In People v. Leyra, n. 23, the suspect declared himself free of his sinus ailment after the psy-
chiatric interview judicially characterized as "torture of the mind."
181 Op. cit. n. 121, p. 10-2, 436-7; op. cit. n. 108, p. 579.
132 Op. cit. n. 126, p. 37-64.
188 Op. cit. n. 121, p. 166-334; op. cit. n. 126, p. 9-10.
134 Watts v. Indiana, n. 3, p. 54.
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ings and those of the average citizen to a common denominator. This the Cor-
nell exp'eriments enable us to do. We need no longer speculate on the physical
and mental effects of prolonged interrogation. We know exactly what they will
be. We now have tangible, factual proof that they cannot be as painful or as
damaging to the suspect's health and well-being as the stresses and feelings en-
dured by the average citizen in his daily life. We must assume that our law tn-
forcement officers do not arrest indiscriminately; have a reasonably grounded
suspicion that their suspect perpetrated or participated in the crime; are able
and desirous of ascertaining 'expeditiously whether their suspect is in fact the
criminal, and wil release him when their suspicions prove unfounded.
If it is "unfair" to expose such a person to the discomforts of interrogation
and detention, it is similarly "unfair" to expose employers to the incessant com-
plaints of their employees, husbands to the bickerings of their wives and teachers
to the tantrums of their pupils. Such distressing encounters are concomitants of
community living. So is the suspect's detention at the police station and obligation
to answer questions until his questioners are satisfied that he is answering truth-
fully. Psychiatric devices have not heretofore been deemed "unfair." Their efficacy
in dispelling unjustified fright has long been recognized. 13 5 The community's
"feeling" about prolonged interrogation is embodied in the statutes directing ar-
raignment immediately or without unnecessary delay. Confessions outlawed for
violation of such a command are not here involved.
The "unfairly" obtained confessions are in a category all their own. Medical
science has now demonstrated that due process does not requiresuch a classifi-
cation or such surrender of community interests.
135 Tillow v. Daystrom Corp., 273 App. Div. 1045 (N.Y. 3rd, 1948); Palloni v. BMT Corp.,
215 App. Div. 634 (N.Y. 3rd, 1926)-fright not reasonable ground for refusing to submit to
operation recommended by workmen's compensation board.
